How do states’ positions across multiple and interconnected economic networks affect their power? The Weaponized Interdependence (WI) scholarship emphasizes that states centrally located in global economic networks have access to new sources of coercion. In this paper, we look at how their positions across multiple networks interact with each other to create new opportunities and vulnerabilities.

How do states’ positions across multiple and interconnected economic networks affect their power? Globalization was not the great equalizer that some either hoped or argued it would be. Instead of becoming flat, the world is in many ways more asymmetrical than ever. As highlighted by the recent literature on weaponized interdependence (WI), many economic activities have indeed become concentrated in a few geographical hubs, creating bottlenecks and chokepoints that some states can use for coercive purposes.

Strengthening intellectual property rights in the Asia Pacific is a priority for both the European Union and the United States. This is for good reason: They together received more than 70 percent of all international revenue for the use of intellectual property worldwide, according to World Bank data. Jean-Frédéric Morin of Université Laval in Québec, Canada, and Madison Cartwright at the University of Sydney in Australia examine the relationship between EU and US regulatory initiatives on Asia-Pacific IPR – and their apparent unnecessary duplication.

Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been a priority for the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). However, over the past two decades, the EU and US have failed to advance their preferred IPR standards through multilateral forums and have pursued bilateral alternatives instead. How have the EU and US pursued their strategies in this fragmented environment? Looking specifically at the Asia-Pacific, we compare their bilateral initiatives on IPR across three strategies: treaty-making, coercion and socialization.